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Introduction
During the 1960s and 1980s the image that Brazilians held about their economy was that it was bound to grow at very high rates. This image was fairly correct, since the country was among the best performers (in terms of economic growth) in the world economy in the 20th century. Between 1900-80 Brazil's GDP per capita grew at 3.4 per cent per annum, while in the same period the world grew at 1.92 per cent per annum. Moreover, growth was seen as a necessary (albeit not sufficient) ingredient to overcome the severe poverty and inequality problems that marked Brazil's economic history. It was therefore paramount in the agenda of both businessmen and policymakers. But this view went though a substantial modification (in a slow but persistent way) since the debt crisis of the 1980s. The focus of economic policy shifted from growth to stability. It was so urgent to fight inflation, which had rocketed in the 1980s, that interest in economic growth gradually faded. Still, economic stabilization in the 1990s did not bring it back into the policy agenda. The Brazilian economy continued to grow at lower rates than the rest of the world, and pessimism about the country's growth prospects is currently widespread.
Pessimism in Brazil arose in a moment in which the country had obtained remarkable successes in two fronts in which traditionally performed poorly: the consolidation of a democratic political regime and the taming of high inflation. Clearly, there are several reasons that contribute to explain why Brazil could not attain, after 1982, the same rates of economic growth that it had attained in previous decades. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address all these factors. We do intend, however, to highlight two variables that we believe carry a significant weight in explaining this failure and in shaping prospects for growth in the long run. The first one is related to the main trends of structural change in the Brazilian economy. It is argued that Brazil's economic structure is moving towards sectors that are less technologically-intensive and this may have negative consequences for growth. The second is the absence of an efficient technological and industrial policy aimed at heightening the capabilities that already exist in the Brazilian industry. In the next sections we will focus on how these two variables interact comparing the Brazilian case with other countries and in particular with other members of the CIBS (China, Brazil, India and South Africa) group.
The paper is organized in four sections besides this introduction. Section 2 presents a simple balance-of-payments-constrained growth model in which the interplay between structural change and the technology gap defines relative rates of economic growth in the international economy. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the intensity and direction of structural change using various indicators of technological intensity of the industrial structure (section 3) and the trade structure (section 4). In these sections Brazil's indicators are compared with that of a broad sample of countries, and particularly with the indicators of the CIBS group. Section 5 concludes.
The model: a Schumpeterian view on convergence and structural change
An important tradition in economic theory argues that technological change is the key for sustained long run growth (Schumpeter 1934) . In particular technological learning and its interaction with the pattern of specialization contribute in a critical way to define relative growth rates in the international economy (Cimoli 1988; Fagerberg, 1988 Fagerberg, , 1994 Dosi et al. 1990; Peneder 2002) . 1 In this paper we build on this literature to suggest a simple model in which the technology gap and the economic structure co-evolve defining the rate of growth.
The point of departure is the empirical rule that states that in the long run the sustainable rate of growth of the economy should be that compatible with equilibrium in current account. 2 Formally:
(1)
X is the volume of exports, M is the volume of imports, P is the domestic price level, P* is the international price level, E is the nominal exchange rate (units of local currency per dollar), Z is world income, Y is real domestic income, φ and ν are negative price elasticities and ε and π are positive income elasticities. Equations (1) and (2) are constant-elasticity equations of demand for exports and imports, respectively. Equation (3) gives the condition for current account equilibrium. Small letters represent proportional rates of growth (e.g.:
is the rate of growth of the quantity of exports). Equations (4) to (6) are obtained through logarithmic differentiation with respect to time of equations (1) to (3). y* is the rate of growth which keeps the current account in equilibrium, defined by equation (7), which is obtained by substituting (5) and (6) in (4). Finally, equation (8) is obtained from (7) plus the additional assumption that in the long run the real exchange rate remains fairly constant, as stated in the dynamic version of the principle of purchasing power parity. Equation (8) represents what has been labeled Thirlwall's Law (McCombie 1989) .
Despite of its simplicity, equation (8) gives some useful insights about long run growth.
In particular, for sustainable convergence is required that ε/π should be higher than the unity. In this case the South will be able to grow at higher rates than the North without compromising external equilibrium. The key is how to interpret the income elasticities of exports and imports and to have some theory as about how they evolve through time.
We will assume that elasticity ratio ε/π is a function of the pattern of specialization, which in turn reflects Schumpeterian leads and lags in innovation and international diffusion of technology. The dynamics of technological learning give rise to structural change, reshaping the income elasticities of exports and imports, and redefining the position each country occupies in the international division of labour. This allows us to write the elasticity ratio as a function of the equilibrium values of the technology gap (G) and of the country's economic structure (E), as in equation (9).
We will now look at the variables in equation (9) Nelson and Phelps 1966 and Verspagen 1993) . On the one hand, a high technology gap is an opportunity for imitation and in this sense it boosts the potential rate of technical change in the South. On the other hand, if the technology gap is too high, the South would not have the minimum capability levels required to learn and effectively become an imitator (Narula 2004) . In this paper we will assume that the influence of the technology gap on the rate of growth of the gap is negative, that is, the gap represents an opportunity for the South to seize upon. The higher the North-South gap, the higher the rate of learning in the South (this rate depending on the South's own efforts for catching-up).
But it is not only the initial gap that contributes to define the rate of technological learning in the South as compared to the North. A more diversified and complex industrial structure has also a positive effect on technological progress. The more diversified towards high-tech sectors the Southern economic structure is, the higher will be the rate at which it approaches the technological frontier. Some industries produce more technical change than others and this represents an avenue by which the economic structure affects the dynamics of the gap. This can be formally represented as follows:
In the above equation g is the rate of change of the technology gap G (
, while E represents the weight of high-tech sectors in the Southern economic structure. Higher values of G and E allow for Southern catching up, leading to a fall in G (g < 0). The parameter a represents an autonomous component in the rate of growth of the gap. Still, the causality between the technology gap and the economic structure does not go just in one direction (from structure to technology). The technology gap affects in turn the rate of structural change. More specifically, countries which are more distant from the technological frontier would not be able to compete in new sectors and would be losing ground in those in which technological competition is fiercer. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that structural change ( E E e & = ) depends on the level of the technology gap, according to the following equation:
Clearly (10) and (11) forms a system of two differential equations which yields a saddle point equilibrium, as shown by the following Jacobian (whose trace, -b, and determinant, -jc, are both negative numbers):
The dynamics of the system is depicted in Figure 1A . The horizontal line G* = h/j gives the equilibrium value of G, for which the economic structure is stable (e = 0). The curve GG gives the pair of values of G and E that makes G stable (g = 0).
We are particularly interested in the efforts each country deploys for technological learning, as reflected in their National System of Innovation. The institutional framework aimed at technological diffusion will define the value of the structural parameters r, b and c. A simple exercise of comparative dynamics can help to illustrate this point. We will assume that initially the South is in equilibrium at point H and there is an exogenous increase in the level of investment on technological imitation, giving rise to an increase in the parameter b. This shifts the GG curve to the right (from GG1 to GG2) and defines a new equilibrium position in F, featuring a more diversified, technology-intensive economic structure. The process of structural change is represented by the increase from E 1 to E 2 . As a result, the elasticity ratio ε/π changes as well, allowing the South to grow at higher rates than before the adoption of the new policy. This can be seen in Figure 1B , that represents the relation between relative rates of growth and the economic structure. As an example, it is assumed that the South moved from a situation of international divergence (the South grows less that the North, y < z) to one of international convergence (y > z). Figure 1A also shows that there is a certain economic structure for which the elasticity ratio equals 1 and for which there is neither sustainable convergence nor divergence (represented by the vertical line E[ε/π =1]). 3 To the extent that F is to the right of this vertical line, the South is in the zone of sustainable convergence. 4 In sum, from a Schumpeterian point of view sustainable convergence requires structural change so as to redefine the elasticity ratio in such a way that the South may grow at higher rates than the North with current account equilibrium. In the next section we assess empirically this hypothesis by studying the process of structural change in Brazil from a comparative perspective. In section 2 the focus is on the industrial structure, while in section 4 we analyse the trade structure. Figure 1A shows how an increase in b (the rate at which the South absorbs foreign technology) leads to a new equilibrium in which the economic structure is more technology-intensive (from H to F). This shift may be caused by a more vigorous technology policy. Figure1B relates structural change to the relative North-South rate of growth. In this case, the South moves from divergence (y/z < 1) in H to sustainable convergence (y/z > 1) in F. There exists an economic structure E[ε/ π =1] for which ε/ π = 1 and therefore there is neither sustainable convergence nor divergence (y/z = 1).
3 Structural change: the industrial structure
Changes in the industrial structure
The interest in the relation between structural change and growth is far from new. From Schumpeter (1934) to Prebisch (1949 Prebisch ( , 1981 , Hirschmann (1958) and Nurske (1953) , the dynamics of economic development has been seen as closely associated with changes in the participation of different sectors of the economy in total GDP and employment. Moreover, such an interest has been reinvigorated in the last two decades (see Cimoli et al. 2005; Palma 2005 ). In part this reflects the Schumpeterian influence underlying most of new growth models (particularly evolutionary models), along with the accumulation of empirical evidence pointing out that certain activities are more conducive to technological learning and productivity growth than others. Several works have sought to identify specific branches of manufacturing in which technology evolves faster. Kaldor (1966) , for instance, argued that the bulk of technical change was generated by the manufacturing sector, which played a leading role in productivity growth. 5 More recently, Cimoli et al. (2005) and ECLAC (2007) have used different indicators of structural change with a view to assessing the role of the economic structure on growth. This paper continues this line of analysis with a focus on Brazil and the CIBS countries.
We will argue that economies in which structural change occurs in favour of technology-intensive sectors tend to grow at higher rates. The structure of the economy affects its rate of learning. Still, it is not easy to measure with precision to what extent an economic structure is more technologically-intensive than other. In this section we use a set of proxies with a view to comparing the structure of Brazil with a sample of countries which includes the CIBS countries (for a similar approach see ECLAC 2007). By using several proxies we aim at correcting for the biases that each proxy taken in isolation could produce. It will be shown, based on these indicators, that Brazil and Latin America have been unable to keep pace with the rest of the world as regards structural change. In turn, this may help to explain why Brazil has lagged behind in terms of GDP per capita growth since the 1980s.
The first proxy of technological intensity of a country's economic structure is the Krugman Index, defined as:
X ij is the participation of sector i in the total manufacturing value added of country j while X iR is the participation of the same sector in the total manufacturing value added of country R, which is the benchmark. R must be a country which features a high participation of technology-intensive sectors in its industrial structure and which has reached (or it is very close to) the technological frontier. Thus, the assumption is that in a country with a high KI the technology intensive sectors are poorly represented in manufacturing. The larger the 'distance' KI of country j with respect to the reference country R (which is the technological leader), the less technologically intensive country j is considered to be. In addition, if KI increases through time, then structural change in j goes in the 'wrong' direction (the structure of j becomes increasingly different from that of the advanced economy).
The sectors used to compute the KI are the 28 sectors of the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) as provided by the UNIDO Databank. The country used as a reference is the United States, for being a mature economy very close to the international technological frontier. Although the United States is not the technological leader for every industry, it can nevertheless be considered a reasonable benchmark, to the extent that it is one of the main sources of technology and a leading market for exports from developing countries.
How has the Brazilian economy performed from the standpoint of structural change? Graph 1 presents the evolution of the KI in Brazil since 1970 to 2005. It is easy to see that the there is a positive trend, suggesting that structural change in Brazil failed to keep pace with the reference country. It can also be seen that all CIBS countries diverge too in terms of economic structure with respect to the benchmark. Such structural divergence 6 is particularly evident when we compare the CIBS group with the Asian economies that have achieved rapid growth in the last decades, like Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (see Graph 1). It should also be noted that China, the best performer (in terms of growth) in the CIBS group is as well the one which has only a modest increase in KI. Moreover, not only the trend of the KI matters, but also its absolute value. 7 It is clear that China has the lowest KI within the CIBS group (its economic structure is relatively more similar to that of the mature economy). Last but not least, China diverged from the United States because it surpassed the US in sectors like electrical machinery and increased its advantage in chemicals, which reflect the process of upgrading of the Chinese structure.
Graph 2 offers (in two different forms) a comparison of the CIBS group with a larger set of countries, plotting the average KI value of each country in 1970-1980 and 1990-2000 . Countries above the 45 o line increased the 'structural distance' with respect to the reference country between the two periods (a rise in KI), while those below this line reduced such a distance (a fall in KI). Clearly, Brazil, as most Latin American countries, is among the countries that structurally diverged with respect to the industrial leader. This is as well the case of the other CIBS countries (although in the case of China, as mentioned, structural divergence is related to an increase at particularly high rates of value added in the metal-mechanical and electronic sectors).
Industrial structure and growth
Has structural convergence shown any systematic relationship with growth? Graph 3 divides the sample of countries in different groups according with the direction of structural change (y axis) and the rate of economic growth (x axis). The horizontal line ΔKI = 0 represents a situation in which the variation of the KI index is zero between 1970-1980 and 1990-2000 and therefore there is no relative structural change. On the other hand, countries whose ΔKI is above the horizontal line (ΔKI > 0) diverge in terms of the economic structure with the reference country, while those below it converge (ΔKI < 0). In turn, the vertical line points out the average rate of growth of the world economy in the same period. Countries that are on the left of the vertical line diverge in terms of GDP per capita and countries on the right converge.
Moving clockwise in Graph 3 from Northwest to Southwest, four groups of countries can be identified. The first is formed by countries that have experienced both structural divergence (the variation of the KI was positive) and GDP per capita divergence (the rate of growth of GDP per capita was lower than the average in the sample). This group includes Brazil and the Latin American countries in general. The second group shows structural divergence but GDP per capita convergence. There are few observations within this group, mainly countries that have been lucky enough in the commodity lottery these years and others then enjoyed a rather special insertion in the international economy (like Luxembourg). The third group is formed by countries that achieved both structural and GDP per capita convergence. In this group we find most of the Asian countries and some of the most successful European economies (like Finland and Ireland). Finally, the last group is formed by countries that could not achieve GDP per capita convergence, in spite of having achieved structural convergence.
Most observations lie within the first and third groups, reflecting the strongly negative correlation that exists between the two variables (variation of KI and economic growth). Although simple correlations are not rigorous proof, this result may be seen as a stylized fact giving support to the idea that structural convergence and GDP per capita convergence have tended to go hand in hand in the international economy. Of the CIBS countries, India, Brazil and South Africa are in the first group (structural and GDP per capita divergence), while China is in the second (GDP per capita convergence and minor structural divergence orientated towards high-tech sectors).
Sources of productivity growth in the industry
Another form of looking at structural change is by analysing productivity growth in the manufacturing industry between 1970-2000. In particular, we are interested in two variables: (i) the total increase in labour productivity, which reflects the intensity of learning and technological catching up; (ii) the sources of labour productivity growth, which either stem from changes in the structure of the employment (a higher share of employment in sectors with higher levels of productivity plus the increase in employment in sectors whose productivity rises) or from productivity growth within each sector. These variables can be measured by means of a shift-share exercise, based on the flowing equation:
The term on the left hand side gives the total increase in labour productivity (
) between period one (2000) and zero (1970) . The terms on the right hand side decomposes the sources of this increase. The first source (I) is related to changes in employment shares, while labour productivity in each sector is considered constant. If the share in total employment of the higher-productivity sectors rises, then total labour productivity will rise too. The second term (II) is a dynamic or interactive term, giving the contribution to total labour productivity due to a rise in the employment share in sectors whose productivity has increased in the period. Finally, the third source (III) is the contribution of productivity growth in each sector, assuming that employment shares remain unchanged. Table 1 displays the results obtained with the shift-share exercise for the CIBS countries. Two conclusions can be drawn from this Table. First, all CIBS countries show relatively lower rates of growth of total labour productivity. This contrasts with the much better performance of countries like Korea, Ireland and Finland that show both a fall in the KI index and higher rates of economic growth in recent years. In the case of China and India, lower productivity growth may be related to the expansion of labourintensive industries. In particular, the large scale migration of workers away from the countryside in China probably contributed to slowing down the rate of growth of labour productivity in manufacturing. Second, in all countries most productivity growth is explained by the within sector component (source III), while structural change had a lesser impact (sources I and II). However, the interactive term proved to be very significant in a few cases, particularly in Ireland and Australia, where they explain more than 20 per cent of total labour productivity growth.
In sum, the previous results confirm what has been already pointed out in the literatureproductivity growth within sectors is the main source of labour productivity growth in the manufacturing industry, with few exemptions (Fagerberg 2000) . Changes in manufacturing value added suggest a larger role for structural change than changes in employment. As regards total labour productivity growth, CIBS countries were less dynamic. In the case of China, however, massive migration from rural to industrial areas probably had a critical influence in this result.
The trade structure
The pattern of specialization offers a different perspective for assessing structural change as compared to manufacturing. Such a pattern determines the income elasticities of the demand for exports and imports, which represent critical parameters defining the rate of sustainable economic growth, as discussed in section I. In addition, some recent papers have stressed that the quality of exports are more important for growth that their quantity (Hausmann et al., 2005; Lall et al. 2005) . All these reasons suggest that it is necessary to look in more detail at the structure of exports and imports in order to have a more comprehensive view of the role of structural change in growth.
We will look at the trade structure based on two indicators. The first one is the trade balance of different sectors of the economy grouped by technological intensity. We used the typology suggested by Lall (2000) which identifies four groups of goods: (i) basic products, (ii) low-technology, (iii) medium-technology and (iv) high-technology goods. To the extent that the trade balance does not only respond to the evolution of technological leads and lags, but it is also influenced by the real exchange rate (at least in the short run), the latter variable is included in the analysis. The second indicator is the participation of high and medium-tech export in total exports, which is a proxy for the technological intensity of the export structure.
Graph 4 focuses on the specific case of Brazil. Two stylized facts emerge from the analysis of this Graph. First, Brazil has a positive trade balance in basic goods and a negative balance in high-tech goods, regardless of the behaviour of the real exchange rate. Thus, the technology gap is paramount in defining the trade balance in the case of the high-tech sectors, while static comparative advantages prevail in the case of basic and low-tech goods. These sectors do respond to changes in the real exchange rate, but not to the point of changing the signal of their trade balance. Second, the trade balance of the medium-technology sectors is very sensitive to the real exchange rate. In this case the valorization of the local currency (a lower real exchange rate) is capable of changing the signal of the trade balance. 8 In other words, within a certain range of the technology gap, a higher real exchange rate may compensate for lower productivity levels in a laggard country. But when the technology gap increases significantly (as in high-tech sectors), then changes in the real exchange rate are of little use. In other words, for having a significant influence on the trade and industrial structures, the exchange rate policy must be seen as a central part of the industrial and technological policies. 9 The tendency to currency overvaluation which has become prominent in Latin America in the last years is therefore a matter of serious concern for those interested in technological and industrial development in the region. Table 2 shows the trade balance (as a percentage of total trade) of all CIBS countries. It is clear from this that Brazil and South Africa mainly rely on their exports of natural resources, while having trade deficits in the high-tech sector. Brazil, however, has managed to achieve a sustained trade surplus in autos. India, in turn, depends mainly on its exports of low-tech manufactures and agricultural based manufactures. China detaches from the other CIBS, as it has moved from a trade deficit to a trade surplus in electronics, autos and engineering, while keeping a strong trade surplus in low-tech goods.
A second indicator of the pattern of specialization is the participation of hightechnology goods in total exports. In all CIBS countries the participation of high-tech exports in total exports is less than 10 per cent, with the exemption of China. When the broader sample is analysed, it can be seen that there is a positive correlation between the participation of high-tech exports total exports, and economic growth. As mentioned, this positive correlation probably combines supply-side effects (exporting high-tech goods produces more learning and productivity growth than exporting commodities) and demand-side effects (high-tech goods have a higher income elasticity of the demand for exports).
Graph 5 shows the evolution of the participation of high-tech and medium-tech exports in the CIBS countries. Two different situations can be identified. On the one hand, Brazil and China have a larger participation of those exports than India and South Africa. There are different patterns of international specialization within the CIBS group, due to the key role of natural resources in South Africa and of the service sector in India. On the other hand, the Chinese trend is strongly positive, while Brazilian exports are stagnated. China began with a much lower participation of high-tech and medium-tech exports than Brazil in the 1980s, but it caught up and by the mid-1990s had already surpassed Brazil. These different trends in industrial exports may help to explain why the two countries exhibited so different growth trajectories in the last two decades. In effect, Graph 6 shows that, taking a much larger sample of countries, there is a positive association between rates of economic growth and the participation of hightech exports in total exports. Clearly, this association does not mean causality, but to the extent that high-tech exports are related to a higher dynamism of demand in international trade, it gives support to the prediction of equation (9).
Conclusions
Long run growth is based on a Schumpeterian process of structural change, in which innovation and learning bring about quantitative and qualitative change. The evidence presented in this paper confirms recent findings of the literature, pointing out that certain kinds of structural change (namely those in which technologically intensive sectors increase their participation in the economy) favour growth. This process of structural change was measured by the Krugman Index and by the participation of hightech and medium-tech exports in total exports. Both variables show a positive association with relative rates of growth in the international economy.
As regards the CIBS countries, we found that, with the exemption of China, they structurally diverged with respect to the benchmark (the USA). Structural divergence was very modest in the Chinese case, particularly taking into account that it had been an extremely closed economy which rapidly opened up to international trade. Moreover, this structural divergence is in part due to very high rates of growth in sectors like electrical machinery, which reached a larger participation in China than in the United States. At the same time, the distance between the two countries in transport equipment sharply fell. Therefore, in this case, a higher KI did not imply a weakening of high-tech sectors.
In the same vein, from the standpoint of the participation of high-tech and medium-tech exports in total exports, China clearly overcomes all the other CIBS countries. South Africa and India show very low participations of these exports, while the position of Brazil is intermediate: although in the 1980s it was clearly above the other CIBS countries, its high-tech and mid-tech exports stagnated after 1990. As a result, Brazil has lagged behind China and there is no evidence that this trend would be reverted in the near future. Many factors of course concur to explain this, but a critical point is probably the different exchange rate policies followed by China and Brazil. In the case of China, this policy has sought to avoid the valorization of the Yuan, while the Brazilian Real has gone though several episodes of steady appreciation in the 1990s and after 2003. 45 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
